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Based on an unbalanced panel of all Bavarian cooperative banks for the years of 1989-97
which includes information on 283 mergers, we analyze motives and cost effects of
small-scale mergers in German banking. Estimating a frontier cost function with a time-
variable stochastic efficiency term we show that positive scale and scope effects from a
merger arise only if the merged unit closes part of the former branch network. When we
compare actual mergers to a simulation of hypothetical mergers, size effects of observed
mergers turn out to be slightly more favorable than for all possible mergers. Banks taken
over by others are less efficient than the average bank in the same size class, but exhibit
on average the same efficiency as the acquiring firms. For the post-merger phase, our
empirical results provide no evidence for efficiency gains from merging, but point instead
to a leveling off of differences among the merging units.
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1  Introduction
Between end of 1990 and 1997 more than 1,300 banks vanished from the German
banking market. This decline in the number of banks at an annual rate of 4.6% is almost
entirely due to mergers and acquisitions within the industry. Since Germany is still
thought to be „over-banked“, this tendency towards higher concentration will probably
continue in the near future, albeit at a somewhat slower rate. From an industrial
economics perspective, this merger wave can be considered a huge experiment
concerning the trade-off between social efficiency losses and cost efficiency gains from
mergers. As for the former, increasing concentration could strengthen the market power
of surviving firms, resulting in higher prices for loans and services. This aspect should
primarily be relevant for mergers among major banks which have begun to occur in
Germany only very recently. As for the latter, large-scale production, a better mix of
outputs, or enhanced management quality could lead to higher cost efficiency of merged
banks. From the work of Aiginger and Pfaffermayr (1997) on some non-banking sectors
we know that social benefits from reduced costs may easily offset social costs of higher
prices and lower output levels.
In this paper we focus on the cost side of mergers among cooperative banks.
1 These
banks which are typically very small and together make up about 70% of all German
universal banks have been dominant in the recent merger wave. More specifically, we
analyze cost effects of mergers among Bavarian cooperative banks, which represent by
far the largest subgroup of the German cooperative banking sector and provide us with
firm-level data on 283 mergers between 1989 and 1997. Following Berger and
Humphrey (1992), we distinguish between pre-merger and post-merger cost considera-
tions. According to bank managers, size effects, i.e., economies of scale and economies
of scope, constitute the most important pre-merger cost incentives for acquiring another
bank. Because the magnitude of size effects depends heavily on the extent to which
branch offices are closed in the post-merger phase (cf. Shaffer, 1993), we consider both
the case of no branch closures and the case of closure of all branches of the acquired
bank. Furthermore, we compare size effects from observed mergers to those of all
hypothetical mergers (for a similar approach with regard to hypothetical mega-mergers
see Shaffer, 1993, and Altunbas et al., n.y.). From Berger and Humphrey (1991) and
Lang and Welzel (1995) we know that in banking X-inefficiency tends to be a much
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  Our database enables us to always identify an acquiring and an acquired bank. Note, however, that
there are no hostile takeovers in our data which explains why we use the term „merger“.- 2 -
more important source of higher costs than scale inefficiency. We therefore examine
differences in the management quality between acquiring and acquired banks. If the ac-
quiring bank is more X-efficient than the acquired bank, we interpret this difference as
an incentive for merger, the reason being that additional profit can be created by
transferring management skills to the acquired bank (cf. Berger and Humphrey, 1992).
In a post-merger analysis of banking costs, we quantify the change in X-efficiency after
a merger and thereby evaluate whether the transfer of better management was
successful.
So far very little work has been done on bank mergers in Germany. Besides the mimeo-
graphed paper by Altunbas et al. (n.y.) which presents predicted size effects of hypo-
thetical mega-mergers, there is a non-econometric analysis of ex post performance based
on balance-sheets by Tebroke (1993). In a paper by Vander Vennet (1996) performance
effects of mergers and acquisitions for the whole EC region are examined. To our
knowledge the present paper is the first panel-based study of bank mergers in Germany.
It extends our previous empirical work on the efficiency of the German banking industry
(see in particular Lang and Welzel, 1996, 1998, Welzel and Lang, 1997). While these
papers on economies of scale and scope and on cost efficiency could provide some
insights into the incentives for mergers, they did not contain any explicit analysis of
mergers. It should be emphasized that a thorough ex post analysis of bank mergers
imposes considerable data requirements. For the present study this problem could be
overcome by building an unbalanced panel dataset consisting of seven years containing
283 mergers with an average post-merger time in the data of 4.2 years. This is
considerably above the 3 years which practitioners of the banking industry often
mention as the time needed for the positive cost effects of bank mergers to prevail. In
addition, the panel permits the use a time-varying X-efficiency term which enables us to
more accurately identify management quality at different points in time.
The plan of the paper is as follows: In section 2 we outline our specification of the
banking technology as well as the implementation and measurement of X-efficiency and
size efficiency. Section 3 contains a description of the data and the observed merger
process. In section section 4 we present our empirical results. Section 5 sums up.
2  Methodology
The concept of a cost function lies at the analytical core of our study. Once estimated in
step one of our analysis, the cost function provides us with all information needed to
determine scale and scope effects of increasing bank size through merging. To allow for
differences in the abilities of bank managers to control costs, we estimate a cost frontier- 3 -
function with a stochastic X-efficiency term capturing bank-specific distances between
actual cost positions and the best-practice cost frontier. All banks in the data can be
ranked relative to this frontier, holding constant all cost factors considered exogenous,
such as output levels and output structure, input prices, or size of the branch network.
Overall cost efficiency of a bank is then determined by its size efficiency (output levels
and mixture) and by its X-efficiency. In a second step, we use this information on
banking technology and X-efficiency to analyze the merger activities among cooperative
banks.
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More specifically, consider the multi-output translog cost function presented in (1). For
each bank k and time period t total costs C are assumed to depend on the vector of factor
prices w, the vector of output levels y, the number of branches br, and a trend variable t
(see section 3 for detailed information on the data). Technical as well as allocative X-
inefficiency is captured by the inefficiency term ukt, which will be discussed below.
Finally, to control for measurement error and cost determinants beyond the control of
management, a second random term  kt Q  is added. The  kt Q ’s are assumed to be i.i.d. with
kt Qa  
2 , 0 X V N  and independent of the explaining variables.
To ensure symmetry and linear homogeneity in input prices, we impose the usual re-
strictions:
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As for the specification of the efficiency term ukt , we follow the stochastic frontier ap-
proach originally introduced by Aigner et. al. (1977) and Meeusen and van den Broeck
(1977). To ensure high flexibility and to make full use of the information in our panel,
the  Battese and Coelli (1992) model is used, which allows for time-varying X-- 4 -
efficiencies in an unbalanced panel. This latter aspect is particularly important in the
framework of the present study because mergers clearly imply that banks disappear from
the sample over time.
For a panel of length T   Battese and Coelli (1992) define the inefficiency term as
  > @ ut T U kt k    exp ( ) K . As in most applications of stochastic frontier analysis, the
positive firm effects Uk  are assumed to follow a half-normal distribution, i.e.,
Uk a   N u 0
2 ,V . This is a special case of the approach of Battese and Coelli who assume
u to follow the non-negative truncation of a normal distribution which, however, turned
out not to be numerically robust. It is assumed that the Uk ’s are independent from the
regular error terms Qkt. Given the exponential specification of ukt , X-efficiency is
increasing, constant, or decreasing over time, if K! 0, K  0, or K 0. Note that K is
assumed to be identical for all banks, leaving Uk  to capture efficiency differences. We
later test this restriction by estimating equation (1) for subsamples.
Figure 1:



















Figure 1 provides an illustration of our specification for a 9-year panel and a positive
value of K leading to increased efficiency over time. In this example, only bank A can
be observed for all nine years, whereas bank C is acquired by the more efficient bank B
after period 3. At the end of period 5, the relatively inefficient bank D acquires unit B.
Efficiency differences can therefore easily be measured as the difference in X-efficiency
at the last period before a merger. To allow for X-efficiency consequences of merging,
however, the merged unit has to be defined like a new entrant to the market.
Furthermore, the jump to a new efficiency path has to be corrected by the trend variable
K. Because of the cardinal definition of X-efficiency (for details see below), the- 5 -
derivation of merger effects is more sophisticated than in Rhoades (1993) who defines
efficiency quartiles and observes movements between them.
The log-likelihood function of our model can be expressed as (cf. Battese and Coelli,
1992)
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with  VVV X
222   u ,  JV V   u
22 ,     KK kt tT    exp ,   )denoting the cumulative
distribution function of the standard normal, and HX E kt kt kt kt kt uC x     c ln . For the
latter expression, all exogenous variables of the cost function (1) are stacked into the
vector  xkt .  TK  is the number of observations for firm K which may be smaller than T.
The maximum likelihood estimation of this function generates estimates of all parame-
ters of the frontier cost function as well as of V
2, K and J .
After solving the maximum likelihood problem (2), aggregate residuals H can be
derived by substituting the estimated parameter vector E into the cost function (1).
Battese and Coelli (1992) have shown that an estimate of firm-specific efficiency is
given by
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Because of the multiplicative relationship in our translog specification,  X EFFkt   can
be interpreted as cost ratio of a fully efficient bank to the deterministic part of the
observed unit, i.e.,        @ @ X EFF x x u kt kt kt kt     exp ' /exp ' , EE 0 1 . A value of one
indicates a frontier firm, whereas a value of, say, 0.8 means that this particular bank
could reduce its costs to a level of 80% of its actual costs.- 6 -
Since due to high degrees of uncertainty the measurement of firm-specific X-efficiency
levels may be problematic, we adapt the approach of Horrace and Schmidt (1996) to
construct confidence intervals for stochastic frontier models to our unbalanced panel
with time-varying firm effects.   % 100 1  O   confidence intervals >@ LU kt kt , f o r
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* are defined as in (3). On the basis of (4), we are able to calculate upper and
lower bounds for X-efficiency levels of every bank and all observation periods.
A translog cost function is non-homothetic and therefore sufficiently flexible to allow
for a wide range of scale and scope effects. We isolate these size effects of mergers by
comparing the aggregate costs of the individual banks to the costs of the merged unit,
where we set input prices of all banks involved equal to the input prices of the acquiring
firm. In detail, a size effect measure S EFFAM  ,  which considers scale as well as scope
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Negative values of S EFFAM  ,  indicate a cost advantage of a merger of the (acquiring)
bank A with one or more banks M. Note that w and y represent vectors of input prices
and output quantities, respectively.
One open question concerns the treatment of the number of branches of the merged
bank in the measure suggested in (5). A whole range from keeping all previous branch
offices - as implicitly assumed in (5) - to closing all branch offices of the acquired bank
in the case of perfect regional overlap seems possible. To separate the impact of scale
and scope effects from the impact of the number of branches on our evaluation of a
merger’s success or failure, S EFFAM  ,  is also calculated in a second version where we
reduce the branch network of the merged unit from br br
AM
M ¦  to br
A thereby
assuming post-merger closure of all branches of the acquired unit.- 7 -
We use this size effect measure not only to examine mergers which actually took place,
but also to make predictions about hypothetical mergers. This is of particular relevance
for our study of cooperative banks because these banks are subject to a principle of
regional demarcation which can be expected to prevent them from picking ideal part-
ners. In our analysis we follow Shaffer (1993) and Altunbas et al. (n.y.) and simulate all
possible pairs of bank mergers. All independent banks in the year 1989 are used as em-
pirical basis for these would-be mergers. This amounts to about 430,000 pair-wise
mergers for which we calculate size effects. With regard to the definition of input prices,
we assume the larger bank to be the acquiring firm.
3  Data
We apply the model specified above to the full sample of Bavarian cooperative banks
which cover about 20% of all German universal banks and more than a quarter of the
cooperative banking segment. Bavarian cooperative banks are of special interest because
of their prominent role in the merger wave: The concentration process started earlier and
has been more intense than in other segments of the German banking industry. We had
access to data from all banks and all mergers of this part of the industry for the period
1989-97, allowing the construction of an unbalanced panel. Information about the num-
ber of banks and the number of mergers is presented in Figure 2.
Figure 2:
Number of banks and number of mergers
total number of banks:       1220
total number of observations:    6731



















Because some mergers involved more than two firms, the number of banks leaving the
panel exceeds the number of merger cases (305 vs. 283). The maximum number of
banks participating in one single merger is four. Moreover, to allow for jumps on the
efficiency paths as a consequence of merging (recall Figure 1), the merged unit is- 8 -
assumed to represent a new independent bank. As a result, the total number of firms in
our data is 1,220 and therefore larger than the number of independent banks in 1989.
A closer look at the merger data in Table 1 shows that - using 1995 prices - more than
60% of all disappearing firms had total assets between 25 and 80 million DM, i.e., were
very small. Interestingly, the size of the average disappearing bank did not increase
during the observation period. Acquiring banks were spread far more evenly over size
classes, with a bipolar maximum density in the range of 100 to 150 and more than 350
million DM of total assets, respectively. For acquiring banks we observe a time trend
with average size growing from 150 million DM in 1989 monotonously to 500 million
DM in 1997. Consequently, the percentage growth because of mergers has been
declining over time. Apart from a few exceptions, the acquiring bank was in terms of
total assets bigger than the acquired institution.
Table 1:
Numbers of mergers by size, 1989-1997


















0 - 2 5 1001000000 2
2 5 - 4 0 0100000000 1
4 0 - 6 0 1620000000 9
T o t a l  a s s e t s 6 0 - 8 0 12 1 160000002 0
o f  a c q u i r i n g 8 0 - 1 0 0 07760000002 0
Institution 100-150 7 9 17 108910006 1
(million 150-200 1 12 11 8 2 10 2 0 0 0 46
DM) 200-250 2 2 9 26540003 0
250-350 1 6 7 75912103 9
>350 0 6 11 14 7 14 13 3 5 4 77
T o t a l1 45 17 55 42 84 72 1 5 6 43 0 5
Total assets in 1995 prices
Estimation of the cost function (1) is based on the full unbalanced panel, i.e., 6,731
observations for 1,220 banks. Every observation corresponds to one year. As for the
definition of inputs and outputs of a banking firm, we follow the majority of the
literature and use the „intermediation approach“ (cf. Sealey and Lindley, 1977). Within
this framework, deposits are treated as inputs and loans as outputs. Total costs therefore
consist of operating and interest costs, the former being defined as costs of labor and
physical capital. Table 2 gives the minimum, maximum, mean values and the standard
deviations in our data.- 9 -
Table 2
Description of the data, 1989-1997
Variable Description Mean Value Standard-
Deviation
Minimum Maximum
Total assets (million DM) 200.4 244.6 8.1 3761.2
C total cost (million DM) 12.2 14.5 0.5 192.3
w1 price of labor
(thousand DM/employee)
84.8 9.9 28.1 154.9
w2 price of capital (%) 14.6 4.9 3.3 80.4
w3 price of deposits (%) 4.5 0.8 2.5 12.2
x1 volume of labor
(employees)
38.2 42.0 2.0 566.0
x2 volume of physical capital
(fixed assets in million DM)
4.5 5.4 0.03 69.4
x3 volume of deposits
(million DM)
179.8 215.8 7.5 3410.0
y1 short-range loans to non-
banks (million DM)
40.5 57.7 0.2 710.8
y2 long-range loans to non-
banks (million DM)
81.5 99.0 1.1 1169.0
y3 loans to banks (million DM) 21.9 35.8 0.01 903.8
y4 bonds, cash, real estate
investments (million DM)
51.3 71.0 0.9 1817.6
y5 commissions (million DM) 1.0 1.4 0.001 17.9
y6 sales from commodities
(million DM)
2.6 4.2 0.001 46.2
br number of branch offices 6.0 5.4 1.0 42.0
Values in 1995-prices; mean values averaged over 1989 to 1997.
Input quantities are measured by the annual average of the number of employees, the
value of fixed assets in the balance sheet, and the volume of deposits both from non-
banks and banks, respectively. Factor prices for labor (w1) and deposits (w3) are calcu-
lated in a straightforward way by dividing expenses through input quantities. For the
price of physical capital we draw upon the concept of user-costs: A price w2  of capital
is generated as sum of a bank’s depreciation rate
2 and its opportunity cost. The former
can be inferred from the balance sheet and the income statement. As for the latter, we
use the firm-specific interest rate for loans less the expected rise in the value of the
physical capital employed. We approximate this latter expectation by the growth rate of
the producer price index for investment goods in Germany.
                                                
2
  Depreciation without write-offs for bad loans.- 10 -
The definitions of the output variables are motivated by theoretical considerations, by
the institutional setup of German banking, by examples from the previous literature, and
by limitations of the data we had access to. We use six outputs  yi i,, ,  16  : short-term
loans to non-banks ( y1), long-term loans to non-banks ( y2), interbanking assets ( y3), a
residual output ( y4), fees and commissions ( y5), revenues from sales of commodities
( y6). Long-term loans have a duration of at least four years. The residual output
includes bonds, cash holdings and other assets not covered by loan outputs  y1 to  y3,
with bonds covering more than 80% of this variable. Notice that only share holdings for
portfolio purposes were included in this variable which therefore does not cover
investments German banks hold in other firms. Using outputs  y5 and  y6 goes beyond
the intermediation approach as commonly modeled: Income from fees and commissions
is a proxy variable to capture an important feature of universal banking in the German
financial sector, namely the fact that banks buy and sell shares and bonds on behalf of
their customers. Revenues from selling commodities, finally, are a specific characteristic
of the cooperative banks which traditionally operate in rural areas and trade in seeds
etc.
3 Since about one third of the banks in our sample no longer engage in these
activities,  y6 takes the value of zero for these banks which implies that the translog
function is not defined. To avoid this problem, we use a substitute value of DM 1,000 in
these cases. All other output variables only take strictly positive values for all banks in
the panel.
4  Results
Table A-1 in the appendix contains parameter estimates from the numerical maximiza-
tion of the likelihood function (2). Apart from the basic model, we also estimated some
alternative specifications in order to test whether a restricted form of the error term or of
the cost function could have been used. Table A-2 presents the likelihood ratio test re-
sults for these models which clearly indicate that the complete model of the cost
function with time-varying efficiency is the most appropriate. With respect to the main
focus of the paper, the most important result is the strong rejection of the hypothesis that
a traditional average cost function as opposed to a frontier function could adequately
represent the data. Furthermore, the hypothesis that efficiency ratios are time-invariant
can be rejected, too. The parameter K of the exponential function explaining ukt  has a
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 Variables  y5 and  y6  are the best indicators available for the services involved here. Dropping
these variables would not be appropriate because on average about 18% of total income are
generated from these services. For a similar approach see Sheldon (1994) and Sheldon and
Haegler (1993).- 11 -
positive value of 0.018, suggesting an increasing trend in bank efficiency. Splitting our
sample into two subsamples - size classes 1-5 vs. size classes 6-10 - showed that smaller
banks could enjoy a higher trend parameter ( 026 . 0   K ) than larger banks ( 00 . 0   K ).
This difference, however, has no real consequences for the main results of our paper:
The correlation of the estimated X-EFF values is 0.98 between the full sample and the
small banks, and 0.96 between the full sample and the larger banks. We conclude that
only the absolute levels of X-EFF are to some degree influenced by the specification of
K, whereas the structure is very robust.
In a next step, efficiency scores X-EFF were calculated on the basis of equation (3) for
all banks and the full range of observed periods. Average values of these predicted
X-EFF for all 10 size classes are plotted against the year of observation in Figure 3. The
definition of the size classes and some more information about the distribution of
X-EFF is given in Table A-3 in the Appendix.
Figure 3


























As can be seen, average X-efficiency turns out to be about 0.92 which provides us with
an important benchmark: The average cooperative bank in Bavaria could reduce total
costs -  including expenses on deposits - by about 8.5% without any adjustments in input
prices, output volumes, or the branching network.
4 At the 90%-level the difference
between the upper and the lower bound of the efficiency interval is 3.5% on average
which is relatively small compared to the findings of Horrace and Schmidt (1996).
About 89% of all banking firms show an interval width from 2% to 7%. As a
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  This result is somewhat more optimistic than previous studies for the cooperative sector (see Lang
and Welzel, 1995, 1996), which applied other frontier approaches and were based on less
observations.- 12 -
consequence of the positive parameter estimate for K, efficiency scores rise slightly
over time, on average from 0.918 in 1989 to 0.929 in 1997. Finally, in terms of X-
efficiency larger banks are somewhat lagging behind their smaller rivals, and this
difference has even been growing over the observation period.
To analyze actual mergers, we calculate the difference in X-efficiency between an ac-
quiring and an acquired bank. In Figure 4 these differences are plotted against the
acquiring firm’s efficiency score.
Figure 4
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Efficiency difference as X-Efficiency of acquiring bank minus (mean) X-Efficiency of acquired bank(s) for
the last period before consolidation. Number of observed mergers: 283.
A positive efficiency difference could be interpreted as an indicator of an ex ante incen-
tive for merging, because the better management quality of the acquiring bank should to
some extent be transferable to the acquired bank, thereby leading to post-merger cost
reductions in the merged bank (cf. Berger and Humphrey, 1992). It turns out, however,
that such ex ante efficiency differences seem to play no major role for mergers among
cooperative banks. As illustrated in Figure 4, in 47% of the 283 mergers the acquired
bank was more X-efficient than the acquiring bank - clearly contradicting the incentive
hypothesis. At the 90% confidence level in only 70 out of 283 merger cases the
efficiency difference turned out to be significantly positive, i.e., the lower bound of the
confidence interval of the acquiring bank was higher than the upper bound of the
acquired institution. Instead, for 80 observations we observe a significant difference in
favor of the acquiring bank. Note in passing that these results are compatible with
anecdotal evidence: Observers of the cooperative banking sector frequently point out
that there are motives like the retirement of a bank’s senior management which can be
as important for merger decisions as efficiency considerations.- 13 -
In the next step of our analysis we calculate the size effect indicator S-EFF for observed
as well as hypothetical mergers. Although the data indicate the existence of increasing
returns to scale - the traditional (ray scale) elasticity of cost with regard to a 1% increase
of all outputs is about 0.95 -, there is no guarantee that external growth through a merger
will create a positive size effect: Notice the non-neutrality of the branching network
with respect to costs which can be inferred from Table A-2 in the appendix. Because
German cooperative banks are mostly located in rural areas and therefore use a
relatively large number of branch offices, these cost effects have to be taken into
account. Furthermore, economies of scope may have a positive influence on the cost
side, if the output mixes match well, but may also worsen the performance of the
merged bank. Both factors can reduce or even reverse the cost gains from economies of
scale. Note in passing that our measure of S-EFF excludes the influence of input prices
(recall equation (5)).
Table 3
Size effects of observed mergers on predicted costs
S-EFF Mean Minimum Maximum
Mergers with
S-EFF < 0
no closing of branches 0.5% -4.4% 9.4% 38.9%
all acquired branches
get closed
-2.1% -10.2% 6.5% 84.8%
Size-effects represent scale as well as scope consequences of mergers. Number of observed mergers: 283.
Table 3 summarizes the results for observed mergers. If the acquiring bank does not
close any branches of the acquired bank, the size effects of observed mergers range from
cost reductions of about 4% to cost increases of 9%. On average, total costs increase by
0.5% due to a merger. Only 38.9% of all merger cases provide cost savings due to a size
effect, if there are no branch closures. If we turn to the other extreme case - all branch
offices of the acquired banks are closed  -, we find no evidence of dramatic cost
reductions due to the size effect of merging. On average there is a cost advantage of
2.1% compared to the pre-merger situation with independent banks. This cost advantage
has to be considered as an upper limit for at least two reasons. First, the closure of all
acquired branch offices will clearly be an exception, and second, the implicit
assumption that closing branches will not reduce output levels is probably not realistic.
In the real world of cooperative banks, the acquiring bank does not enjoy absolute free-
dom in the selection of merger partners. First of all, only mergers between cooperative
banks, but not between a cooperative bank and e.g. a savings bank are possible. Second,
due to the principle of regional demarcation which is still being upheld by the head
association of cooperative banks, a cooperative bank which wants to merge or acquire- 14 -
another cooperative bank is confined to its local or regional neighbors as partners or
targets. This important restriction raises the question whether size effects from mergers
would have been more favorable if others than the observed mergers had taken place. To
answer this question, we calculate size effects for all hypothetical pair-wise mergers and
compare the results to the actual observations.
Figure 5

















S-EFF values on abscissa; no closing of branches. Number of hypothetical mergers: 430,115; number of
observed mergers: 283.
Our results are illustrated in Figure 5 where we plot calculated S-EFF values for ob-
served and hypothetical mergers against their relative frequencies. The cost changes for
all hypothetical mergers cover the range from -7.1% to +20.2%. This is a much nar-
rower and more plausible interval than the range from -56.7% to +73.0% found for
mega-mergers by Altunbas et al. (n.y.).
5 On average, our calculations for simulated
mergers predict a cost increase of 1.9%, which is slightly more unfavorable than the
value found for mergers actually observed (recall Table 3). Interestingly, in spite of the
geographic restrictions on external growth imposed by the demarcation principle, the
distribution of size effects for observed mergers is superior to the one for simulated
mergers, i.e., a random match of banks produces less attractive results than the actual
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  In their analysis Altunbas et al. (n.y.) find on average important cost incentives for bank mergers.
Since they report extremely strong diseconomies of scale, the cost disadvantages of increased size
have to be overcompensated by extremely strong economies of scope which in our view is not very
plausible.- 15 -
merger process. This can be concluded from comparing the densities in Figure 5. Note,
however, that the best simulated merger is by far better than the best actual merger and
that relative - as opposed to absolute - frequencies are depicted in Figure 5. In absolute
terms the observed merger with the most favorable size effect is ranked at position 161
out of 430,115 potential mergers, the second best is ranked at 260, and so on.
Let us finally turn to the ex post performance of merged banks, i.e., the question
whether there exists a positive relationship between the difference in X-efficiency be-
fore the merger and the after-merger performance. For a graphical demonstration of our
results see Figure 6, where for all observed mergers the pre-merger difference in X-EFF
(„efficiency difference“) is plotted against the change in X-EFF („efficiency growth“).
As for the latter, we estimate the growth in X-efficiency from the acquiring bank to the
merged unit. Note that a merged unit is defined as a new firm, because otherwise no
jump in cost efficiency would be possible. To control for the increasing trend in X-
efficiency, the observed change is corrected by the corresponding K term. After this
correction, only 44.5% (the sum of field I and field IV) of the merged banks showed an
outperforming improvement in X-EFF, whereas 55.5% enhanced their X-efficiency by
less than the trend or reached even lower efficiency levels.
Figure 6
































Efficiency difference as X-Efficiency of acquiring unit minus (mean) X-Efficiency of acquired unit(s) for
the last period before consolidation. Efficiency growth calculated as X-Efficiency of merged bank minus
X-Efficiency of acquiring unit, corrected for time trend in X-Efficiency.
More interestingly, from comparing field I to field II and field IV to field III we con-
clude that out of the 53% share of mergers in which an X-efficiency advantage of the- 16 -
acquiring bank existed, just one third (18.2% vs. 34.9%) could sustain or even increase
the advantage of the acquiring bank. Apparently, the transfer of superior management
quality to a badly managed part of a newly merged bank does not work well or at least
does not work quickly enough. If, however, the acquired bank was more X-efficient, as
was the case in 47% of all mergers, outperforming efficiency growth was more frequent
than underperformance or deterioration (26.3% vs. 20.6%). Taking both results together,
our estimations suggest that a leveling off in efficiency differences due to mergers
seems more realistic than the notion of dominance of the acquiring firm for the
management quality of the merged unit.
One might suspect that this statement is too pessimistic because no adjustment period
necessary for restructuring the merged unit is taken into account. For example, officials
from the head organization of cooperative banks claim that a period of at least three
years is needed for realization of the synergy effects. A closer look at ex post
performance, however, yields no evidence to support this claim. Consider Table 4 where
we report efficiency growth results depending on the number of years since the merger
had occurred. There is no sign of a positive correlation between efficiency growth and
the merger date. Even those mergers which took place eight years ago do not turn out to
be more successful than those with a five-year or even a two-year adjustment period.
Table 4




Min -0.05 -0.17 -0.09 -0.09 -0.11 -0.12 -0.06 -0.09
efficiency growth Mean 0.01 -0.02 -0.01 -0.00 -0.00 -0.02 -0.00 -0.00
Max 0.16 0.05 0.10 0.10 0.06 0.09 0.06 0.10
number of cases 47 36 22 33 41 51 32 19
Efficiency growth calculated as X-Efficiency of merged bank minus X-Efficiency of acquiring unit,
corrected for time trend in X-Efficiency.
5  Conclusion
In this paper we make a first attempt at analyzing the size and X-efficiency effects of
observed mergers in the German banking industry. Our empirical estimations are based
on data from 283 mergers among Bavarian cooperative banks during the years of 1989-
97. We would like to emphasize that while cooperative banks dominated the recent
merger wave in German banking, results inferred from these mergers are probably not
transferable to large-scale mergers.- 17 -
One of our main conclusions is that favorable size effects typically arise only if some or
many branches of an acquired bank are closed in the post-merger phase. This is in line
both with the reasoning of „Bayerische Vereinsbank“ and „Bayerische Hypotheken- und
Wechselbank“ which due to their almost identical geographical markets decided to close
branches when they merged in 1998, and with the fact that Germany is „over-banked“ in
the sense of having roughly twice the number of bank branches per person than other
industrialized countries (cf. Economist, 1997, p.  69). Comparing actual mergers to
simulations of all potential mergers we find that size effects of actual mergers are
slightly better than the size effects of hypothetical mergers. The principle of regional
demarcation which forces cooperative banks to pick only neighboring banks as partners
therefore did not impede the realization of size effects through mergers. We also
conclude that pre-merger X-efficiency advantages of acquiring banks are not the main
driving force behind the mergers observed. As for post-merger performance, there is no
evidence for ex ante X-efficiency advantages to transform into superior performance ex
post. Instead, our results point to a leveling off in efficiency differences after mergers
took place. Most disappointingly, even for mergers which took place five or eight years
ago no X-efficiency gains could be observed.
There clearly are quite a number of issues still open to discussion and closer examina-
tion. To name just two, let us mention first the fact that we dealt only with the cost side
of bank mergers. A complete evaluation of the merger process would also have to con-
sider the revenue side, in order to find out whether mergers increase market power (see
Lang, 1996, with results pointing in this direction). Second, and probably more
important for the relatively small banks in our sample, one could ask for the reasons of
the heterogenous ex post performances which we observed.- 18 -
Appendix
Table A-1:
Parameters of the Cost Function
Variable Estimate Standard Error Variable Estimate Standard Error
V X
2 0.00968 0.00061*** 0.5 ln y1 ln y5 -0.00394 0.00516
J 0.88172 0.00801*** 0.5 ln y1 ln y6 0.00029 0.00053
K 0.01805 0.00451*** 0.5 ln y2 ln y2 0.15469 0.01300***
const 1.90651 0.07212*** 0.5 ln y2 ln y3 -0.00915 0.00311***
ln w1 0.18738 0.03944*** 0.5 ln y2 ln y4 -0.05774 0.00617***
ln w2 0.04248 0.02861 0.5 ln y2 ln y5 -0.01103 0.00770
ln w3 0.77015 0.03942*** 0.5 ln y2 ln y6 -0.00306 0.00075***
ln y1 0.19066 0.02333*** 0.5 ln y3 ln y3 0.03066 0.00082***
ln y2 0.20641 0.03790*** 0.5 ln y3 ln y4 -0.03380 0.00212***
ln y3 0.20700 0.01110*** 0.5 ln y3 ln y5 0.00275 0.00252
ln y4 0.27295 0.02196*** 0.5 ln y3 ln y6 0.00022 0.00022
ln y5 0.09575 0.01991*** 0.5 ln y4 ln y4 0.11314 0.00427***
ln y6 0.02997 0.00299*** 0.5 ln y4 ln y5 0.00100 0.00445
0.5 ln w1 ln w1 0.02446 0.01833 0.5 ln y4 ln y6 0.00112 0.00047**
0.5 ln w1 ln w2 0.01433 0.00897 0.5 ln y5 ln y5 0.01826 0.00276***
0.5 ln w1 ln w3 -0.03879 0.01694** 0.5 ln y5 ln y6 -0.00027 0.00055
0.5ln w2 ln w2 0.00774 0.00640 0.5 ln y6 ln y6 0.00768 0.00035***
0.5 ln w2 ln w3 -0.02207 0.00867** ln br 0.04271 0.02020**
0.5 ln w3 ln w3 0.06087 0.01929*** 0.5 ln br ln br 0.02943 0.00497***
ln w1 ln y1 0.00740 0.00786 ln br ln w1 -0.00225 0.00573
ln w1 ln y2 -0.00158 0.01082 ln br ln w2 0.00667 0.00422
ln w1 ln y3 0.00421 0.00376 ln br ln w3 -0.00443 0.00563
ln w1 ln y4 -0.00624 0.00633 ln br ln y1 0.00756 0.00403*
ln w1 ln y5 0.01470 0.00789* ln br ln y2 -0.02640 0.00553***
ln w1 ln y6 0.00348 0.00080*** ln br ln y3 0.01232 0.00179***
ln w2 ln y1 0.00963 0.00510* ln br ln y4 0.00036 0.00396
ln w2 ln y2 -0.01787 0.00745** ln br ln y5 -0.00095 0.00385
ln w2 ln y3 -0.00141 0.00254 ln br ln y6 0.00015 0.00043
ln w2 ln y4 0.00768 0.00472 t -0.13204 0.00561***
ln w2 ln y5 -0.00041 0.00549 0.5 t t 0.00101 0.00032***
ln w2 ln y6 0.00137 0.00058** t ln w1 -0.02375 0.00156***
ln w3 ln y1 -0.01703 0.00784** t ln w2 -0.00602 0.00081***
ln w3 lny 2 0.01945 0.01089* t ln w3 -0.01771 0.00160**
ln w3 ln y3 -0.00280 0.00379 t ln y1 -0.00058 0.00076
ln w3 ln y4 -0.00144 0.00617 t ln y2 -0.00008 0.00109
ln w3 ln y5 -0.01428 0.00786* t ln y3 -0.00146 0.00036***
ln w3 ln y6 -0.00485 0.00080*** t ln y4 -0.00071 0.00059
0.5 ln y1 ln y1 0.11927 0.00712*** t ln y5 0.00074 0.00071
0.5 ln y1 ln y2 -0.05855 0.00763*** t ln y6 -0.00007 0.00007
0.5 ln y1 ln y3 -0.01403 0.00230***
0.5 ln y1 ln y4 -0.03886 0.00445*** observations 6731
*, ** or *** denotes an estimate significantly different from zero at the 10%, 5% or 1% level.
GAUSS was used for all calculations.- 19 -
Table A-2
Likelihood-Ratio Tests
Null-Hypothesis ln L Test Statistics Critical Value* Conclusion
Complete Model -11714.6
Time-invariant
inefficiency ( K   0)
-11706.4 16.5 6.63 Reject H0
No inefficieny
(J K    0)
-9404.4 4620.4 9.21 Reject H0
No technical progress
( ff g h im 01 0       ,
im    123 12 6 ,, ,, ,  )
-10899.9 1629.4 23.21 Reject H0
No influence of branches
(ccde im 01 0       ,
im    123 12 6 ,, ,, ,  )
-11576.8 275.6 23.21 Reject H0
* for a 95% significance level.
Table A-3:
X-Efficiency for Size Classes
total assets (million DM)
s i z e  c l a s s 123456789 1 0











102 799 1009 788 1213 746 496 600 497 481
mean 0.917 0.928 0.926 0.928 0.917 0.920 0.924 0.924 0.925 0.918
standard
deviation
0.090 0.048 0.046 0.042 0.049 0.042 0.039 0.036 0.037 0.052
minimum 0.584 0.767 0.764 0.773 0.364 0.697 0.728 0.826 0.763 0.658
maximum 0.998 0.998 0.998 0.998 0.998 0.996 0.997 0.997 0.995 0.997
Total assets in 1995 prices; X-efficiency averaged over years
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